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Atrocity Crimes Litigation Conference 
Memorandum Regarding 2011 Activity of the  
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 A terrorist attack on February 14, 2005 killed 21 people including former Prime Minister 
of Lebanon Rafik Hariri and injured 231 others. This memo discusses the 2011 activities, 
presented chronologically, of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“Tribunal”), which was created 
in 2009 in order to prosecute the actors involved in this terrorist attack. 
COURT PROCEDURES 
A. Applicable Law 
¶2 On January 21, 2011, Pre-Trial Judge, Daniel Fransen, filed a request for clarification of 
applicable law to the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal. Four days earlier, on January 17, 2011, 
the Prosecutor submitted an indictment to the Pre-Trial Judge. In order to properly examine the 
indictment, the Pre-Trial Judge sought clarification of several questions of applicable law 
relating to (1) the offenses, (2) modes of responsibility and cumulative charging, and (3) plurality 
of offenses covered in the indictment before ruling. The Pre-Trial Judge’s questions and the 
Appeals Chamber’s response are discussed in order below. 
¶3 The Appeals Chamber (“Chamber”) handed down their decisions on February 16, 2011. 
The Chamber sought to interpret the Statute of the Special Tribunal, where possible, by the 
established guidelines set forth in article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. Alternatively, where 
that standard was unclear, the Chamber utilized the general criminal law principle of favor rei (in 
favor of the accused) as the standard of construction. Unlike most international courts, the 
Statute requires the Tribunal to primarily apply domestic Lebanese law in the exercise of its 
primary jurisdiction. Generally speaking, the Tribunal will apply Lebanese law as interpreted and 
applied by Lebanese courts except where that interpretation or application is unreasonable or 
might result in injustice or appears inconsistent with international principles and rules that are 
binding upon Lebanon. 
¶4  The Tribunal’s jurisdiction differs from that of other international criminal tribunals. 
Whereas other international criminal courts and tribunals do not confine their subject-matter 
jurisdiction except by reference to one or more categories of crimes, the Lebanon Tribunal’s 
Statute explicitly limits jurisdiction of the Tribunal to a set of specific allegations. The Tribunal’s 




task is to determine whether those allegations can be characterized, under Lebanese law, as “acts 
of terrorism,” “crimes and offenses against life and personal integrity,” the crime of “illicit 
association,” a crime of “conspiracy,” or of “failure to report crimes and offenses.” Thus, the 
Tribunal takes a reverse approach to jurisdiction compared to other international criminal courts 
and tribunals. Rather than beginning with categories of criminalities to be prosecuted, the 
Tribunal starts with allegations of facts to be investigated and is tasked with prosecuting those 
responsible under one or more specific heads of criminality. Therefore, the Tribunal’s Prosecutor 
cannot “choose” the facts to prosecute or include additional facts, and the Tribunal’s only 
province is to legally characterize those facts. 
¶5 The Statute confers upon the Tribunal jurisdiction that is confined to certain particularly 
serious offenses under the Lebanese criminal law. Therefore, any allegations in an indictment 
must be aligned to one of the crimes identified in the Statute. The purpose of this judgment by 
the Chamber is to add some precision to both what the law of Lebanon requires and to what 
extent the Statute modifies its application. 
¶6 The Tribunal must apply the substantive criminal law of Lebanon, yet it is international in 
provenance, composition, and regulation. It must abide by “the highest international standards of 
criminal justice,” and the Statute provides that it incorporates particular aspects of international 
criminal law. This tension, created primarily between articles 2 and 3 of the Statute, creates the 
most basic question of choice of law: when and whether international law should inform the 
Tribunal’s application of Lebanese criminal law, based on the Tribunal’s international nature and 
mandate. 
¶7 In the application of law, there are three lawmakers whose intent must be harmonized and 
effectuated: the Parliament of Lebanon, with respect to the substantive criminal law referenced in 
article 2 of the Statute; the United Nations, and the Government of Lebanon, which created the 
Statute including the incorporation of some norms of international criminal law in article 3; and 
the Judges of the Tribunal and authors of the Lebanon Code of Criminal Procedure who created 
the rules of procedure and evidence. 
¶8 The Defense Office has indicated that they believe the Tribunal may only apply Lebanese 
law strictly and without regard to the international nature of the Tribunal. However, the Chamber 
rejects this view for three reasons. First, Lebanon is bound by certain international laws, and 
these laws are part of the legal context in which Lebanon’s legislation is construed. Second, the 
application of domestic law by an international court is subject to limitations by international 
law. Third, the Tribunal may interpret different or conflicting views of Lebanese courts in the 
manner in which it deems most consistent with international legal standards. Further, Lebanon 
does not have a formal doctrine of binding precedent.  
¶9 As is made clear by article 2 of the Statute, the starting point of construction is the criminal 
law of Lebanon. The interpretation and application of Lebanese law must meet certain 
conditions: first, it must be consistent with the offense as defined by Lebanese law, second, it 
must have been accessible to the accused at the time of the act, and third, it must have been 
reasonably foreseeable by the accused.  
B. Offenses 
¶10 The Prosecutor’s indictment submission included offenses of terrorist acts, conspiracy with 
a view to committing a terrorist act (“conspiracy”), intentional homicide with premeditation, and 
attempted intentional homicide with premeditation. The Pre-Trial Judge submitted questions for 
each of these offenses individually. 




1. Terrorist Acts 
¶11 Generally, the question regarding terrorist acts is whether the Tribunal should take into 
account conventional and customary international law in order to understand fully this notion, or 
whether it should rely exclusively on the Lebanese Criminal Code. Further, if it is decided that 
other laws should be considered, the Pre-Trial Judge needs to seek clarification on how to 
resolve conflicts that arise between Lebanese law and other law. 
¶12 The Tribunal will apply the Lebanese domestic crime of terrorism, interpreted in 
consonance with binding international conventional and customary law. The objective elements 
of terrorism under Lebanese law are: (1) an act whether constituting an offense under other 
provisions of the Criminal Code or not; and (2) the use of a means “liable to create a public 
danger.” Particular means have been specifically enumerated, including explosive devices, 
inflammable materials, poisonous or incendiary products, or infectious or microbial agents. 
Lebanese case law has held these means do not include guns, machine-guns, revolvers, letter 
bombs or knives. Under Lebanese law, the subjective element of terrorism is the special intent to 
cause a state of terror.  
¶13 However, the Tribunal will not rely solely on the definition of terrorism provided by 
Lebanese domestic law. The allegations under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction have been identified by 
the U.N. Security Council (“Security Council”) as a “threat to international peace and security.”  
The Council’s response, establishing an International Tribunal to prosecute the allegations, 
patently proves that the Security Council considers those terrorist attacks to be particularly grave 
acts of terrorism with international implications. As such, the Tribunal must take into account the 
unique gravity and transnational dimension of the allegations. Therefore, while respecting 
Lebanese jurisprudence, the court is justified in interpreting and applying Lebanese law through 
the lens of international legal standards on terrorism that specifically address transnational 
terrorism and are binding on Lebanon. 
¶14 Beyond Lebanese domestic law, the Chamber will consider the Arab Convention against 
Terrorism (“Convention”), and customary international law on terrorism in times of peace. The 
Arab Convention and other international treaties relied on by the Chamber in its decision were 
ratified by Lebanon in the Official Gazette prior to the acts in the allegations. The Convention 
defines terrorism for the purpose of enjoining the States Parties to prevent and suppress 
terrorism, but simultaneously allows each party the freedom to define terrorism on the basis of its 
own national legislation. Lebanese law and the Convention have two elements in common: (1) 
they both embrace acts, and (2) they require the intent of spreading terror or fear. However, the 
Convention does not specifically require that the underlying act be carried out by specific 
instrumentalities or devices. The Convention requires the underlying act to be violent, and it 
excludes acts performed in the course of a war of national liberation as long as such war is not 
conducted against an Arab country. 
¶15 Based on treaties, U.N. resolutions and legislative and judicial practices of States, a 
customary rule of international law has evolved on terrorism in times of peace. This definition 
requires four elements: (1) the intent of the underlying crime, (2) the special intent to spread fear 
or coerce authority, and (3) the commission of a criminal act (4) that is transnational. Again, this 
definition is broader than that of Lebanese domestic law in that it does not require specific means 
of carrying out the act, but it is narrower in other aspects. First, it is limited to terrorist acts in 
times of peace, second, it requires both an underlying criminal act and an intent to commit that 
act, and, finally, it includes a transnational requirement. 




¶16 In an effort to more closely align Lebanese law with relevant, binding international law, 
the Chamber will expand the domestic definition of terrorism, as detailed in the Chamber’s 
interlocutory decision on February 16, 2011. Rather than strictly adhering to the enumerated list 
of implements, the Chamber interprets that list to be illustrative but not exhaustive. Instead, the 
Tribunal relies only on the firm requirement that the means used to carry out the terrorist attack 
be liable to create a common danger, either by exposing bystanders or onlookers to harm or by 
instigating further violence in the form of retaliation or political instability. 
¶17 As such, the notion of terrorism that will be applied by the Tribunal consists of three 
elements. There must be (1) a volitional commission of an act, (2) through means that are liable 
to create a public danger, and (3) the intent to cause a state of terror. A public danger may occur 
when a prominent political or military leader is killed or wounded. In such an instance, it is 
irrelevant if the act occurs within a private location. 
¶18 These elements do not require an underlying crime. Therefore, the perpetrator of an act of 
terrorism that results in deaths would be liable for terrorism, with the deaths being an 
aggravating circumstance, and may also be independently liable for the underlying crime. 
2. Conspiracy 
¶19 Article 2 of the Statute refers to the Lebanese Criminal Code with regards to conspiracy. 
Article 270 of the Lebanese Criminal Code defines conspiracy as “any agreement concluded 
between two or more persons to commit a felony by specific means.” Article 315 of the Code 
specifically recognizes conspiracies aimed at the commission of terrorist acts. However, this 
article was suspended by article 1 of the law enacted on January 11, 1958. Article 7 of the law 
states that “[e]very person who enters into a conspiracy with a view to the commission of any of 
the offenses with a view to the commission of any of the offenses contemplated in the preceding 
Articles shall be liable to the death penalty,” including acts of terrorism. 
¶20 As with the definition of terrorist acts, the Pre-Trial Judge again sought clarification 
regarding inclusion of international law in order to interpret the constituent elements of the 
notion of conspiracy. Whereas in conventional and customary international law, conspiracy is 
recognized as a specific offense, in national law it is sometimes a specific offense and sometimes 
a mode of responsibility. 
¶21 Conspiracy is primarily a domestic crime without equivalents under international criminal 
law. Therefore, the Tribunal will apply Lebanese law. The elements of conspiracy under 
Lebanese law are (1) two or more individuals, (2) who conclude or join an agreement, (3) aimed 
at committing crimes against State security, and (4) with an agreement on the means to be used 
to commit the crime with (5) criminal intent. For the Tribunal’s purpose, the aim of the 
conspiracy must be a terrorist act. 
3. Intentional homicide with premeditation and attempted intentional homicide with 
premeditation 
¶22 Article 547 of the Lebanese Criminal Code makes homicide an offense, stating that 
“[a]nyone who intentionally kills another person shall be punishable by hard labour for a term of 
between 15 and 20 years.” Intent is described in article 188 as “consist[ing] of the will to commit 
an offense as defined by law” and article 189 deems an offense intentional if the perpetrator had 
“foreseen its occurrence and thus accepted the risk” even if the criminal consequence of the act 
or omission exceeded the perpetrator’s intent. Attempt is made a criminal offense under article 




200 which provides that “[a]ny attempt to commit a felony that began with acts aimed directly at 
its commission shall be deemed to constitute the felony itself if its completion was prevented 
solely by circumstances beyond the control of the perpetrator.” 
¶23 Two primary requests were posed to the Chamber. First, the Pre-Trial Judge requested the 
Chamber to draw on both Lebanese law and customary international law to identify which 
constituent elements of the notions of homicide with premeditation and attempted intentional 
homicide with premeditation should be considered. Second, the Chamber was asked to indicate 
whether an individual may be prosecuted for intentional homicide with premeditation for 
offenses committed against persons who were not specifically targeted. 
¶24 Like conspiracy, intentional homicide and attempted homicide are primarily domestic 
crimes without international criminal law equivalents. Therefore, the Tribunal will apply 
Lebanese law. 
¶25 The elements of intentional homicide in Lebanese law, which will be followed by the 
Tribunal, are as follows: (1) an act or omission aimed at impairing the life of a person, (2) 
resulting in the death of a person, (3) a causal connection between the act and the death, (4) 
knowledge, and (5) intent. 
¶26 Lebanese law defines the elements of attempted homicide as (1) preliminary action aimed 
at committing the crime, (2) the subjective intent required to commit the crime; and (3) absence 
of a voluntary abandonment of the offense. The Tribunal will apply these elements. 
C. Modes of Responsibility 
¶27 The Tribunal’s Statute provides no general guidance regarding whether provisions relating 
to modes of responsibility are to be interpreted in the light of Lebanese criminal law or 
international law. With regards to complicity in a criminal offense, article 2 of the Statute refers 
to the Lebanese Criminal Code. However, article 3, entitled “Individual criminal responsibility” 
draws heavily on international law and on the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”). 
¶28  The Pre-Trial Judge asked the Appeals Chamber to decide, both generally and with 
specific reference to commission and co-perpetration, which criminal mode of responsibility the 
Tribunal should apply. 
¶29 The Chamber determined either Lebanese law or international criminal law definitions of 
modes of responsibility could be used by the Tribunal. Article 2 of the Statute requires the 
Tribunal to apply Lebanese law regarding “criminal participation” as a mode of responsibility. 
Article 3 specifies various modes of criminal liability utilized in international criminal law, 
including commission, complicity, organizing or directing others to commit a crime, contribution 
to crimes by a multitude of persons or an organized group, superior responsibility, and criminal 
liability for the execution of superior orders. For this matter, the discretion was left to that of the 
Pre-Trial Judge and the Trial Chamber. The Pre-Trial Judge and the Trial Chamber will evaluate 
on a case-by-case basis. If they find that there is a conflict between the application of Lebanese 
law and international criminal law, the body of law that is more favorable to the accused will be 
used. Otherwise, if there is no conflict in application, Lebanese law will apply. 
D. Cumulative Charging and Plurality of Offenses 
¶30 The Statute does not address the issue of cumulative charging and plurality of offenses. 
Therefore, the Pre-Trial Judge requested that the Chamber decide how to address the issue. 




International criminal tribunals have generally allowed cumulative charging and plurality of 
offenses in indictments as long as the charges were only confirmed at the end of the proceedings. 
On the other hand, the ICC has dismissed such charging under certain circumstances, concluding 
that it can be detrimental to the rights of the accused and lead to lengthy proceedings. Moreover, 
the ICC leaves the responsibility of legally defining the allegations made against the accused to 
the judges. 
¶31 In this light, the Pre-Trial Judge asked the Chamber specifically to determine under what 
circumstances, if any, the Prosecutor could define the same act in several different ways. 
Specifically, this question was raised in relation to the offenses of terrorist conspiracy, terrorist 
acts, and intentional homicide with premeditation or attempted intentional homicide with 
premeditation. Further, if the Prosecutor may define the same act in several ways, the Chamber 
was asked to determine whether the classifications may be used cumulatively or as alternatives. 
¶32 Both Lebanese law and international criminal law provide for multiple offenses and allow 
multiple charging. Therefore, without the presentation of any particular facts, there is no reason 
to reconcile any conflict between the two bodies of law. Neither body provides a clear general 
rule as to whether cumulative or alternative charging is preferred. However, the Pre-Trial Judge 
should allow cumulative charging only when separate elements of the charged offenses make 
these offenses truly distinct. When one offense encompasses another, the Judge should always 
choose the former and reject pleading of the latter. If the offenses are provided for under a 
general provision and a special provision, the Judge should favor the special provision, and 
modes of liability for the same offense should be charged in the alternative. 
¶33 The goal of the Pre-Trial Judge should be to provide clarity to the Defense. Therefore, the 
Chamber has determined that additional charges should be discouraged unless the offenses are 
aimed at protecting substantially different values. This approach should enable more efficient 
proceedings while avoiding unnecessary burdens on the Defense. Specifically under Lebanese 
law, the crimes of terrorist conspiracy, terrorism, and intentional homicide can be charged 
cumulatively. These crimes do not entail incompatible legal characterizations, and the purpose 
behind criminalizing such conducts is the protection of substantially different values. Therefore, 
in most circumstances, it is appropriate to charge those crimes cumulatively rather than 
alternatively. 
2011 COURT DECISIONS 
E. Release of Information to El Sayed1 
¶34 Jamil El Sayed was detained by the Lebanese government and briefly by the STL in 
connection with the Hariri assassination. El Sayed requested disclosure of confidential evidence 
and court documents held by the STL Prosecutor, claiming that the documents were necessary 
for his pending civil suit against the Lebanese government for wrongful detention and libel.  
¶35 The Prosecutor appealed the initial finding of jurisdiction, arguing both that release of the 
documents would prejudice the prosecution by revealing highly sensitive information, and also 
that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear El Sayed’s case as El Sayed was not a party to the 
trial and therefore did not have standing to appear before the Court. The Appeals Chamber 
upheld the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding of implicit jurisdiction. Implicit jurisdiction is necessary 
                                                 
1 STL, In the Matter of El Sayed, OTP/PTJ/2012/10, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/in-the-matter-of-el-sayed. 




to “remedy possible gaps in the legal regulation of the proceedings.” Further, the decision 
enabled El Sayed to obtain some documents held by the Prosecution. 
¶36 The Pre-Trial Chamber then held on May 12, 2011 that certain redacted documents must 
be released to El Sayed. The Pre-Trial judge found a "general right of an accused to have access 
to documents in his criminal file, based on a broader right of defense and the general principle of 
equality of arms, as well as on the practice of national and international courts." 
¶37 The Pre-Trial Judge issued another decision on September 2, 2011, requiring the 
Prosecutor to disclose the statements of certain people who had been interviewed during U.N. 
investigations. The Prosecutor appealed further, arguing that such disclosure would either put the 
author of a document or another person at risk or impede the due conduct of the litigation. 
¶38 The Appeals Chamber found on October 7, 2011 that some of the statements of 
interviewees must be provided to El Sayed in accordance with the Pre-Trial Judge’s order, 
redacted according to proposals by the Prosecutor as long as the final product was not 
inconsistent or incomplete. The Prosecutor worked in conjunction with the Victims and 
Witnesses Unit (VWU) to assess any necessary protection of persons who provided the 
statements being released, including the aforementioned redactions. 
¶39 The Appeals Chamber also found that others of the ordered statements should not yet be 
released because the implications of their release had not been previously assessed by the VWU. 
During the appeal, the Prosecutor demonstrated cause for concern of risk relating to people who 
had made statements; this risk had not been presented in the initial trial. While this may be 
considered a failure of the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber nonetheless remanded the analysis 
to the Pre-Trial Judge for a new decision using the VWU analysis of the remaining statements. 
The Appeals Chamber maintained that El Sayed is entitled to the disclosure of these documents, 
but that the ultimate goal is to balance this disclosure with the protection of individuals. 
F. Indictments 
¶40 An attack on February 14, 2005 killed former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri and 
21 others and resulted in injury to 231 others. An indictment naming four suspects was filed on 
June 10, 2011.2 All four accused allegedly played important roles in the attack and therefore all 
bear criminal responsibility for the results of the attack. 
¶41 Charges were brought under the Lebanese Criminal Code and the Lebanese Law of 11 
January 1958 on “Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war, and interfaith struggle;” nine 
counts as follows: 
¶42 Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad 
Hassan Sabra- (1) Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act. 
¶43 Mustafa Amine Badreddine and Salim Jamil Ayyash- by means of explosive materials: (2) 
Committing a Terrorist Act, (3) Intentional Homicide of Rafik Hariri with premeditation, (4) 
Intentional Homicide of 21 additions homicides with premeditation, (5) Attempted Intentional 
Homicide of 231 additional people with premeditation. 
¶44 Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra- by means of explosive materials: (6) 
Being an Accomplice to the felony of committing a terrorist act, (7) being an accomplice to the 
felony of Intentional Homicide of Rafik Hariri with premeditation, (8) being an accomplice to 
the felony of Intentional Homicide of 21 additions homicides with premeditation, (9) being an 
                                                 
2 STL, Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan 
Sabra, STL-11-01, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01. 




accomplice to the felony of Attempted Intentional Homicide of 231 additional people with 
premeditation. 
¶45 The case was built on circumstantial evidence, which is recognized by the Court to have 
similar weight and probative value as direct evidence and to be, in some cases, stronger than 
direct evidence. The Prosecutor has stated that circumstantial evidence, meaning many facts that 
seem unimportant individually but create an irrefutable story when combined, can be conclusive. 
Additionally, because of the nature of crimes of terrorism, where “small and secretive cells, 
which sometimes act in a clandestine fashion,” the network behind such crimes can be difficult 
to identify. Further, because members of terrorist organizations tend to be bound by strong 
ideological or religious beliefs, even once apprehended, they often refuse to release any specific 
information to be used as direct evidence.  
1. The Accused 
¶46 Mustafa Amine Badreddine is a citizen of Lebanon. Badreddine was convicted in Kuwait 
for a series of terrorist acts (including suicide bombings of the French and U.S. embassies) in 
1983. He was sentenced to death, but escaped when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. He is 
considered to be the overall controller of the operation of the conspiracy to assassinate Hariri. 
Salim Jamil Ayyash is also a citizen of Lebanon. He is believed to have coordinated the 
assassination team’s physical perpetration of the attack. Hussein Hassan Oneissi, also a citizen of 
Lebanon, allegedly prepared and distributed a false claim of responsibility for the attack with 
Assad Hassan Sabra, also a citizen of Lebanon. 
2. Facts of the case per the Indictment 
¶47 On February 14, 2005, Hariri was assassinated when a suicide bomber detonated a large 
quantity of high explosives concealed in a van. The explosion also killed 21 other people and 
injured 231. Shortly following the attack, Al-Jazeera News Network received a video of a man 
falsely claiming to be the suicide bomber on behalf of a fictional fundamentalist group. 
¶48 Identification of the suspects was made through evidence including witness statements, 
documentary evidence, and Call Data Records (CDR) for mobile phones in Lebanon. CDRs 
contain information such as incoming and outgoing phone numbers, dates, times, and durations 
of calls, and approximate locations of mobile phones. 
¶49 CDR analysis identified five networks involved in the assassination. Networks are 
described as either covert (members only call each other) or open (members sometimes call 
others outside the group). Co-location was used to determine approximate locations of network 
phone use, and also to connect those locations with use of personal mobile phones (PMPs used 
for communication with family, friends, and legitimate business associates who are easier to 
trace than covert network users). By tracing PMP usage and contacts, network members could be 
identified. Networks are color-coded as follows: 
¶50 Red network (covert): used by the assassination team until two minutes before the attack. 
Red network users also used one blue phone. Ayyash led the assassination team (conducting 
surveillance and physically carrying out the attack), and other members are unidentified as yet. 
All red network phones were activated near Tripoli on the same date. Co-location shows that red 
network phones were used for 33 calls within the two hours before the attack for surveillance of 
Hariri. The phones were last used two minutes before the attack, by which time the van had 
reached its final position. Based on this information, the prosecution believes that it is reasonable 




to conclude that the red network phone use is inconsistent with innocent or coincidental 
communication. 
¶51 Green network (covert): used for control and coordination of the attack until one hour 
before the attack. 
¶52 Blue network (open): used by the assassination team for preparation of the attack and for 
surveillance of Hariri over the four months preceding the attack. 
¶53 Yellow network (open): activated between 1999 and 2003 and operation until January 
2005, when they were mostly replaced by blue phones. 
¶54 Purple network (open): used to coordinate the false claim of responsibility until February 
15 or 16, 2005. 
¶55 It appears that some network members used multiple phones on different networks. 
Ayyash used at least eight phones: one red, one green, one blue, one yellow, and four PMPs. He 
allegedly coordinated the assassination team through red and blue phones and communicated 
through PMPs with phones in the purple network, likely to monitor false claim preparations. 
Badreddine used at least eight phones: one green and seven PMPs. Some of the PMPs were 
attributed to Badreddine’s alias Sami Issa. Badreddine only communicated with Ayyash, likely 
to control preparation and execution of the attack. Oneissi used at least one purple phone and 
communicated with an unidentified person, likely to report on progress of the false claim of 
responsibility. Sabra used at least one purple phone. 
¶56 In addition to the coordinated surveillance of Hariri that was shown through these calls, the 
phones were also linked to the purchase of the van used in the attack and to communications 
with Abu Adass, the person who filmed the false confession and has been missing since the day 
he went to meet Oneissi to create the video. The remains of the suicide bomber were examined, 
but the remains were of a male who was not Abu Adass. 
¶57 Starting about seventy-five minutes after the attack, Oneissi and Sabra made calls from 
public payphones to Reuters and Al-Jazeera News claiming responsibility from a fictional 
jihadist group, “Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria.” They also told Al-Jazeera News that the 
video was left in a tree near their offices, and Oneissi watched the location to confirm receipt by 
Al-Jazeera News. The video was broadcast after menacing threats were made to Al-Jazeera 
News by Oneissi or Sabra. With the video was a letter stating (falsely) that Abu Adass was the 
suicide bomber. 
3. The Conspiracy 
¶58 The Prosecutor alleges that, beginning between November 11, 2004 and January 16, 2005, 
conspirators carried out surveillance, the phone networks were established, and Abu Adass went 
missing. All four named members of the conspiracy were supporters of Hezbollah (a political 
and military organization in Lebanon). The military wing of Hezbollah has been implicated in 
past terrorist acts, and people trained by this military wing are known to have the capability to 
carry out terrorist attacks. 
¶59 Badreddine and Ayyash are related to each other and to Imad Mughniyah as brothers-in-
law. Mughniyah was a founding member of Hezbollah in charge of its military wing from 1983 
to 2008. Based on their experience, training, and affiliation with Hezbollah, the Prosecutor 
believed that it was reasonable to conclude that Badreddine and Ayyash had the capability to 
plan and execute this attack, and that all of the conspirators agreed to the goal of committing this 
terrorist act, as well as to create the false claim of responsibility in order to identify the wrong 




people to investigate, shield the conspirators from justice, and add to the state of terror in the 
population. 
G. Arrest Warrants 
¶60 On June 30, 2011, arrest warrants for the four named suspects were issued to Lebanese 
authorities, which have the responsibility of locating and arresting the suspects. Much doubt 
exists as to whether the Hezbollah-controlled Lebanese government will even attempt to carry 
out the arrests. The arrest warrants stated that the identities of the indicted people would be made 
public if the arrests were not made within thirty days of the issuance of the arrest warrants. As no 
arrests were made, the names and photos of indictees were released on July 29, 2011, when the 
President urged the indictees to come voluntarily before the tribunal. The debate about 
Lebanon’s continued support of the STL continues (further discussed below). 
PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE COURT 
H. Resignation of President and Prosecutor 
¶61 On October 10, 2011, Judge Sir David Baragwanath from New Zealand was elected as the 
new President of the STL. Judge Baragwanath, who had been appointed by the STL since 2009, 
succeeds Judge Antonio Cassese as the President of the STL. Around the time of the Judge 
Cassese’s resignation, there was much debate regarding the conduct of the Prosecutor Daniel 
Bellemare, and apparently a number of judges and other members of the STL were also 
considering resigning in protest of Bellemare’s conduct, mainly relating to his tactics used in the 
matter of the release of witness statements to El Sayed (above). However, Judge Cassese 
resigned from the post due to health reasons, and on October 22, 2011, he passed away at age 
seventy-four after a battle with cancer.   
¶62 Less than two months later, Bellemare announced that he would not seek to renew his post 
as Prosecutor at the end of his term (February 2012) due to health reasons. No replacement has 
yet been named, and concerns regarding the efficacy and judgment of the prosecution and 
investigation persist. 
¶63 B.  Duty Counsel Assigned to Defense 
¶64 On October 28, 2011, the Head of Defense Office selected eight people as members of the 
duty counsel for the four accused. They were selected based on their experiences with Lebanon, 
terrorism cases in general, and international tribunals. If the Trial Chamber decides to begin in 
absentia proceedings, the duty counsel assigned will represent the accused unless the defendants 
decide to voluntarily participate in the proceedings. 
VICTIM INVOLVEMENT 
¶65 The STL’s mandate includes the means for victims of the attack to join court proceedings. 
It is not common for international tribunals to include victims in the proceedings, but they may 
be used in this case as witnesses. A victim is defined as anyone who sustained physical, material, 
or psychological harm from the attack. Victims will not be considered “parties” in the case, so no 
damages may be awarded to them; however, they will be entitled to present their views and 
concerns in the proceedings. Victim participation in the trials is based on an application 
submitted to the Pre-Trial Judge. If granted, a victim may ask to hear witnesses, see evidence 




offered by any party, submit his or her own evidence, and question and cross-examine witnesses, 
all as administered through the Trial Chamber. Further, victims will be asked to speak during the 
sentencing process. Finally, victims are permitted to be involved in the appeals process, though 
they will not themselves be entitled to lodge appeals. Though victims may not recover damages 
through the STL, they may present rulings by the STL as evidence in national courts in order to 
recover. Applications to the Pre-Trial Judge were due in October 2011. 
FUNDING ISSUES 
¶66 As of November 30, 2011, Lebanon paid its $33 million (USD) dues to cover forty-nine 
percent of the STL operating expenses per the STL’s statute. The Hezbollah-backed president 
and majority of the cabinet were adamantly opposed to funding the STL, which they see as a 
corrupt instrument of U.S./Western interests. However, the Prime Minister, elected with the 
support of Hezbollah, kept a strong stance backing the STL and encouraging continued funding. 
